It is to be expected that the annexation āreferendumsā will be completely rigged ā both in terms of the turnout and the results. This will be made easier by organizing the vote (for ārefugeesā from Ukraine) on Russian territory and, probably, some remote voting.
2/10
Annexation will lead to the paradoxical situation that part of the āRussianā territory will be under the āoccupationā of Ukraine, which, on the one hand, will hit the prestige of the
, but, on the other hand, will justify the necessity of their rapid āliberationā.
3/10
Moscowās political objective is to create faits accomplis that propaganda could present as a victory (however limited) for Russia in a āspecial operationā, while masking recent defeats on the frontline.
4/10
Putinās declaration contained false accusations that the West is threatening Russia with nuclear weapons and claiming the West wishes to destroy it. This should be seen as part of psychological warfare.
5/10
The decision to mobilize marks a break with the pretence of implementing a limited āspecial operationā in Ukraine (despite Moscowās continued use of the term) and turns it into a full-scale war.
6/10
Mobilization, combined with the formal annexation of partially occupied Ukrainian territories, means in practice that Russia will be able to legally compel conscripted soldiers and drafted reservists to participate in combat.
7/10
The decisions carry political risks for the Putin regime. This is because they mean that the war and its consequences will potentially affect wider sections of society and that Russians will increasingly fear that the confrontation with the West will also escalate.
8/10
It is to be expected that Putinās decisions will lead to an increase in Ukrainian attacks, including acts of subversion, in the annexed territories, and will force the West to further significantly tighten restrictions against Russia and increase support for Ukraine.
9/10