Musk is about to learn why Trust and Safety teams spend a lot of time dealing with “the recidivism problem”.
Question for
@Elon Musk: will you be reactivating the accounts of the Russian GRU, Chinese Ministry of State Security and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp? Or the fake accounts run by the US DoD?
Most of these government influence networks are not actually breaking US law.
Some examples of inauthentic influence operations taken down by a Twitter team that no longer exists, run by leadership that has quit.
RU ops targeting COVID and Ukraine:
stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:fs4…
Armenia, Iran, and Russia:
cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/februa…Indian military influence operations targeting Kashmir:
stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:zs1…
Five years of fake networks run by the US Military:
stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:nj9…
Great follow-up by
@Ellen Nakashima
washingtonpost.com/national-secur…Cuba, Saudi Arabia and Thailand join our old friends in Russia:
cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/twitte…
Of course, the People's Republic of China:
fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/si…
So, Mr. Musk, do all these accounts come back?