On the Xi-Blinken meeting in China: People can relax about Xi Jinping not accepting 'strategic competition', or that he called competition 'inconsistent with the trends of the times' (大国竞争不符合时代潮流). A short /1 https://english.news.cn/20230619/bb64247b16b1498f86af3fbd6d9525bc/c.html…

A. Rejecting strategic competition is China's longstanding position. Rhetorically China is still arguing that US-China should be pursuing a condominium-like cooperative relations, which China calls 'New Type of Great Power Relations' (since 2012) (中美新型大国关系). /2

China's Defense Minister just called for that NTGPR again at #SLD23 just 2 weeks ago. So Xi's position at Xi-Blinken meeting is well in line with prior expectation. /3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUjHF1-b-dE…

B. The fact that it's not new also means if China were to change, and to accept US' preferred framing, it would symbolize China compromising and 'giving face' to America. It would be a #gift. /4

In Chinese politics they sometimes give face to their equals or superiors. They don't give face to people ranked lower than them. Now, does this sitting arrangement look like Xi think Blinken is his equal? /5

Which is to say that even if Xi were to give face to somebody, it would happen when Xi meet Biden (his equal), not when he meets Biden's subordinates. So let's keep our expectation low on China accepting competition framing, at least until Sept's G20 summit or November's APEC./7

C. Xi's rejection of US-China competition framing is mostly for international signaling. Domestically, Xi has indirectly accepted it and indeed politically utilized that framing. /8

Read foreign policy & political stability related speeches & writings from top Chinese leaders over the last couple of years, many point out "the world is undergoing the kind of transformative shift it hasn't seen in a century" (世界正在经历百年未有之大变局). /9

That means among others that US-China relations has changed -- no longer a stabilizing factor for China's international position, that China's relations with the leading superpower of much of the 20th century & early 21st is getting more tense and/or competitive. /10

Which is China's indirect way of accepting the strategic competition framing. Why else would Xi be repeatedly & publicly demanding China's military to be ready to fight and win wars by/before 2027? /11

In short, internationally, 'strategic competition' may be US' framing, to which China repeatedly reject, calling it 'cold war mindset'. But internally, China has long accepted that competition framing & has used it to help drive China's own political-military mobilization. /12

To understand how Beijing thinks, we should listen to not only what Chinese leaders say at occasional international theaters or high-profile meetings, but what China's leadership says and writes to its own people & cadets on a lot more frequent basis. /13