1/ Some thoughts around the context of Orban’s conduct towards Ukraine, which some people seem to misinterpret. Of course it is a pressure point *too* within the EU, helping him to get “his” moneys back. But it is incomparably more than that.

2/ Point one: it is widely believed that Orban and Putin made a deal: Hungary gets Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region for annexation; a region that was part of Hungary and still hosts a huge ethnic Hungarian community.

3/ The swift Russian victory both hoped for didn't materialize of course, but Orban might still hope that if Ukraine collapses, he gets his chunk of it, which for him would mean as close as it gets to sainthood before his domestic public and literally power for life.

4/ Point two: Orban punching above his weight in international affairs rests on him balancing between the grand ones: the EU and Russia, and China and the U.S.. If Russia terminally weakens, his weight diminishes. That’s not in this interest.

5/ Third: Orban has created a situation where he depends financially on Putin/Russia. Beyond the obvious commodity price games, there are material business ties which provide billions to Orban and his entourage (referring e.g. to Russians building Hungary’s new nuclear plant).

6/ If Putin's circles were to weaken (let alone fall), this would mean very huge financial losses for Orban and his gang personally.

7/ Fourth, and most important: Orban is playing a long game. He really & truly abhors liberal democracy and its manifestation, the EU. For long, he has been banking on (and trying to accelerate) a Europe-wide demise of liberal democracy and a take-over of ethno-populist forces.

8/ This is why his alliance with Putin is more than a mere balancing act: they share the abhorrence vs enlightened Western values. Orban wants those values to lose the battle for peoples' hearts in Europe and therefore he can’t have them shine and produce positive results.

9/ Put yourself in Orban’s shoes and consider the start of EU-accession talks with Ukraine from this angle: it’s a multiple nightmare.

10/ If one accepts the notion that a key goal for Russia’s aggression was to eliminate the political threat to Russian authoritarian elites that is inescapably posed by a neighbouring "brother nation" that is democratic, free and successful at once, then the perspective of a...

11/ ...Ukrainian EU-accession is a poison pill to that Russian plan like no other. And if that perspective indeed helps Ukraine's struggle, then that becomes a tale of the inspiratory power of liberal democratic institutions - which is poison to Orban’s political core as well.

12/ He can’t allow that. He has built his power on the notion that liberal democratic values are an evil scam. He’s been banking on the slow but steady hollowing out and loss of legitimacy of liberal democratic principles and its manifestations with the entire European public.

13/ He can’t have these liberal democratic values shine, gain traction, be filled with positive emotional content again; he can’t let it vitalise a nation attacked by a dictatorship, let alone one attacked by a dictatorship that is his ally.

14/ Ultimately, Orban hates the idea of EU-accession talks with Ukraine for the very same reason that passionate European democrats like it:

15/ it will strengthen Ukraine by the mere power of values, which as a consequence is likely to reflect back on the European appeal of those same values, conflicting with Orban's long-term struggle to dismantle those values.

16/ "Down-to-Earth" people might ridicule such considerations as too strongly psychologizing, lacking a hard power element and therefore being irrelevant.

17/ However, Orban understands very well that mid- and long-term shifts in politics are driven by exactly this kind of sweeping, tectonic changes in the publics’ beliefs and mindsets - and his success has proven him right.

18/ Summing up, this subject touches core interests of Orban and hence one should expect him to remain determined and aggressive on it – for many years. He will not only (threaten with the) use of his veto but work tirelessly to build anti-Ukraine alliances / blocking coalitions.

19/ The EU will find that Orban is even much more inconvenient and disruptive when strategic aims of his are at stake. The leverage Orban has carved out for himself in the EU is already bizarre but will further increase IF they don't change how this game is played.

20/ And there is only one way to change that, and it's not the institutional reform taking away vetos as such. That is a phantasy and will never happen. It is Article 7: taking away Orban's vote. It is inevitable - the later EU leaders realize this, the larger the damage. End.

@Alberto Alemanno @Marlene Wind @Dr Radosveta Vassileva @John O’Brennan @R. Daniel Kelemen @Laurent Pech 🇺🇦 curious for yr thoughts