Take war to Russia in 2024! Current discussion, if Ukraine will be able to liberate her territory, mostly ignores that UA has war goals that go beyond "simply" kicking the Russians out. Aggressive asymmetric warfare vs Russia might present a solution to achieve these goals. 1/

Pres. Zelenskyy emphasized, that liberating territory is before all a way to stop human suffering under Russian occupation. The Ukrainian campaign to return Russian hostages, POW and abducted children expands this goal in face of Russia creating a fait accompli in this matter. 2/

Liberating territory alone won't do for Ukraine, she needs to develop a significant threat scenario to reach her broader victory conditions. The very structure and size of the Russian empire presents itself as weakness to exploit. Internal logistics and hydrocarbons are key. 3/

Asymmetric warfare has already been a success for Ukraine. Attacking the Black Sea Fleet with drones and long range PGM allowed opening a grain corridor. PGM and sabotage attacks on logistics in occupied territory stressed Russian supplies. Late last year sabotage reached BAM. 4/

BAM and Transsib are the rail spine of the Russian empire. They do not only serve to transport arms from NK or the increased commerce from China - These lines also are essential for commerce between the federal subjects of the RF. Vital commerce due to the economic structure. 5/

Attacking rail logistics has the advantage of possible implementation in distributed fashion. The effector can be applied at different time and location of the attack, outside of FSB surveillance capabilities, and transported via rail itself to the designated target location. 6/

While first targets likely would be the bridges & tunnels (as happened) of the E/W rail axis, the distributed approach makes it possible to cause seemingly random & repeated havoc at any point of the rail network. This would significantly hamper logistics and repair capacity. 7/

Effective defense versus distributed attacks on the rail network is almost impossible to establish, even mid term. A problem that also concerns analysts in regards to western critical infrastructure. The main challenge for Ukraine would be access to explosives inside Russia. 8/

Truck logistics also has a prominent role in Russia. Some regions would be effectively decoupled from the Russian economy when rail and truck logistics fall below critical operation margins. This applies in particular to regions providing the commodity / hydrocarbon cash cows. 9/

Addressing the road based logistics has to be done indirectly, most likely by attacks on the hydrocarbon processing infrastructure. Along these lines Ukraine has already carried out attacks on storage and refineries, albeit on small scale and relatively close to the front. 10/

Large refinery capacities and distribution of production let an attack via sabotage appear less favourable. This is where the domestic Ukrainian drone program could come in. Long range drones with effectors designed to attack refinery infrastructure can be a viable approach. 11/

Ukraine attacking refineries will force Russia to make increasingly difficult choices in setting priorities. Export of processed hydrocarbons is increasingly becoming important. The war consumes heaps of fuels, domestic logistics and agriculture are also critically reliant. 12/

Arguably the hardest target to attack would be the vital Russian waterways. While viable attack vectors can be developed, they might put the involved personell at unacceptable risk. Shipping yet, by itself, will suffer from impeded rail/road logistics as the whole economy. 13/

It can be argued, that a broad Ukrainian attack on Russian rail and refinery infrastructure might anger Western allies who are set on preventing escalation. Yet such an approach would demonstrate that Russia is not having unilateral escalation dominance in this conflict. 14/

A demonstrated Ukrainian ability to conduct a campaign of deep, painful strikes inside Russia could serve as a deterrent against (for xmpl) further escalating Russian attacks on civilians. Degrading the deep logistic tail in Russia will also have positive impact on the front. 15/

Russia herself is using hybrid/asymmetric means to compensate for her severely degraded capability to project power globally. Ukraine would be essentially confronting Russia with a similar scenario. That even superior military power can't win long term vs hybrid escalation. 16/

Russia is betting on the success of her hybrid attack on socio/political stability of Ukraine's supporters. Yet cracks are visible indicating that RF internal stability is also diminished and far from it's peak. Attacking logistics can increase RF domestic political issues. 17/

While the RF population in general will most likely continue to simply endure mounting pain, the impact on regions & interest groups might be different. A broken rail spine could lead to trans Baikal regions to increasingly economically align with China. Fiefdoms will suffer. 18/

Up to now, partially due to Western fear of escalation, the war has been fundamentally imbalanced for Ukraine. It has taken place on Ukrainian soil, killing Ukrainian civilians. All dreams of brokered peace circle around ending Ukraine's suffering. Russia needs to suffer too. 19/

Only if Russia desires peace with Ukraine such a peace will be just and persistent. Presenting Russia with territory or lifting sanctions is reward, not relief. It promotes war. Degrading Russian infrastructure might be the pain that is needed so Russia seeks peace as relief. 20/

Russia will feel the pain of Ukraine successively dismantling her infrastructure. Each day the war continues Russia cannibalizes her own future & accrues cost. Deep strikes on infrastructure could be the part to accelerate this to painful levels fast. 21/ https://x.com/spartyflyboy/status/1740676467195793518?s=20…

Some Western decision makers might revolt at such a scenario. It could lead to increasing impulses for Russian decolonization as @Alexander Etkind describes. But then, aggression needs to have cost. A campaign for 18/19th century conquest has the risk to lose territory yourself. 22/

Western nations can't be party by aiding Ukraine in conducting deep strikes on Russia. But by now, or in the near future, Ukraine will most likely have developed the capabilities to carry out such missions by herself. The independence from Western support is essential here. 23/

Ukraine's ultimate war goal arguably is to extinguish Russian appetite for conflict & war with Ukraine. Deep and persistent strikes at Russian infrastructure may develop a range of existing issues into an escalating polycrisis for RF. Russia then may need peace more than war. 24/