Russia vs NATO - A Scenario Russian aggression isn't limited to Ukraine. Before the backdrop of constant threats to the Baltics and other European nations, the question when and where RF might strike again is of eminent importance. Thisexplores an early option for Russia. 1/

Strategic Foresight Much of the debate whencan strike again centers around estimates for's recovery from the enormous attrition by Ukraine. As @Fabian Hoffmann explains the notion ofengaging in a prolonged large war as in Ukraine might be misleading. 2/ https://x.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236?s=20…

Arguablyplaners did not expect the invasion of Ukraine to develop into an attrition nightmare. The demonstratedmodus operandi is a hybrid attack with intent for a swift military engagement component. Foresight demands to explore the options for an early hybrid engagement. 3/

Russian Strategic Goals is open about the intent to destroy/weaken Western democracies and alliances like the EU or NATO. is already conducting extensive ops to destabilize Western political systems and fuels elements of polycrisis in support. This could stall UA mil aid. 4/

Of particularinterest are the Baltics.considers them seceded provinces. They are also staunch advocates to deterwhile being under NATO's mutual defense policy umbrella. Successful action vs the Baltics would serve severalstrategic goals and undermine NATO as guarantor. 5/

Russian Capabilities war against binds almost all forces available for a larger military engagement. yet retains significant intel and SOF capabilities. NATO Posture Enhanced presence on eastern flank w/ air power appears sufficient to currently prevent a largerattack. 6/

Suwalki Gap Successfulmilitary action in the Suwalki Gap would require military force build up. Conducted under direct observation by heavy NATO ISR presence. Anyattack preparation could be timely deterred by NATO deployments. Suwalki threats would bedistraction effort. 7/

Limited Russian Incursion A more promising scenario, well within currentcapabilities, would be a limitedincursion e.g at the/border. Employedassets would be mostly SOF (green men), intel officers, civilians and Rosgvardia. Focus on disruption, not territorial gains. 8/

Russian Pretext & Hybrid Operation Essential asset for aop would be elements of thediaspora in. Hybridattack utilizing migrants led to closure of the border via the xmas holidays. This, and deportations ofnationals, caused extensive dissatisfaction in thediaspora. 9/

In face of FSB activities in thediaspora,has elected to conduct aggressive countermeasures. This will increasingly limitability to utilize civilians in a hybrid attack. in turn reacted by building up the usual pretext of a need to protect "human rights of Russians". 10/

"Protecting Russians" in other sovereign nations is a repeatedly demonstrated narrative to justify aincursion. is creating a faux "human rights" umbrella that is in conflict with NATO's military guarantee ofsovereignty. will try to resolve this via hybrid operation. 11/

Scenario: Humanitarian Border Crisis Ifso choses to conduct a hybrid operation vs NATO via, the first phase would be to stir up unrest in thediaspora. In the whole Baltic, Finland and eventually supported by demonstrations in other countries with diaspora, like Germany. 12/

Unrest across the region will make it harder to assess wherewill place the main effort. In the 2nd phase the protests will move towards the border, possibly demanding opening for humanitarian reasons. NATO troops could be deployed to secure the border as riots bind police. 13/

Phase 3 will seecivilians join protests on theside of the border, an increasing number of SOF "little green men" posing as civilians mixed in. NATO forces can't engage here as it's a police issue. Protests will stretch police thin, especially in Narva and at checkpoints. 14/

Depending onpolice and force deploymentwill develop 1-2 attack vectors. A mix of "patriots", civilians and SOF would then storm the border brushing police aside, potentially using small arms, laying the blame onfor using "violence" against "defenseless"civilians. 15/

Phase 4 would see SOF expand the area of control usingcivilians as shield. In case of unexpected resistance or frictions,SOF may elect to shoot atcivilians that are held back byforces. Even a 100+ mass casualty event is possible in the attempt to shockforces back. 16/

Phase 5 would see the insertion of fast, lightly armed (AK,RPG) Rosgvardia, eventually using civ cars, to secure the relatively small incursion perimeter. Narva, utilizing urban environment to deter military expulsion attempts, could be ideal. civilians serve as shields. 17/

Constraints of NATO Response The hypothetical hybrid attack would make it difficult for NATO forces to engage. would threaten with escalation while NATO military would be confronting a wild mix ofcivilians, SOF & Rosgvardia. In the endmight expand her nuclear umbrella. 18/

Depending onactivation of the diaspora, protests could also severely hamper NATO logistics and mobility. Blocking gates of garrisons, protests that close roads might deny NATO forces timely and decisive reaction. The situation would demand police instead of military action. 19/

Diplomacy, NATO & Baltic Sovereignty The discussed scenario is designed to delivera fast stalemate after trespassing with tiny footprint onsoil. Ideally short before an important conference like the MSC. Then a mil response automatism is less likely & diplomats take over. 20/

In the face of direct military confrontation over a limited incursion,might rightfully expect that NATO seeks a diplomatic solution. Especially if a civilian mass casualty event (see Chechnya war pretext) was employed. will then set demands infringing onsovereignty. 21/

demands may be theguarantee to keep border open, stop deportations and haveas 2nd official language. NATO's promise to defend every inch of territory would then be devalued, trust of Baltic states undermined. This scenario is agame of chicken with NATO pol leadership. 22/

Strategic & Geopolitical Relevance If the discussed scenario is successfully employed it will reduce NATO's credibility. Depending on if the diplomatic pipeline is engaged and how prominent Western detente voices are, this will also affect other regions of crisis like CN/TW. 23/

might succeed to demonstrate how even a militarily far inferior but decisive actor can overpower the indecisive liberal democracies. At a time in which the global struggle autocracy vs democracy is also a threat at home, such a small event could have catastrophic results. 24/

Prevention Continued indecisiveness vshybrid aggression is bedrock to the current dilemma. Unlike in the past, even smallprovocations, subcritical escalation and interference in our societies need swift, strong response. Before all, deterrence needs Ukraine's victory. 25/

It's telling a story, that a call for resounding Ukrainian victory is necessary. This story is one of not stoppingaggression early. As with almost any conflict, the longer aggression lasts, the harder it is to stop. The Baltic states knowwell and learned this lesson. 26/END

For a more detailed read about the Narva scenario, this article is out today: https://piontk052.comv.info/material.php?id=65AEF432A4EF9…