Losing The Intelligence War With Russia While Ukraine valiantly fights the Russian military the collective West is far behind in it's defense versus Russia's intelligence onslaught. So far the response is timid, overly cautious, effectively giving GRU & SVR free reign. 1/

Arguably the most pressing issue with Russian intelligence is that they're able to continue to operate in relative sanctuary. The services, their operatives are effectively shielded from operative risks or repercussions. Accountability is rarely enforced, deterrence is absent. 2/

The cases where Russian operatives are caught, convicted and actually serving their penalty are far and few between. Russia takes innocent victims hostage as exchange fund for their imprisoned operatives. The exchange of Viktor Bout with Britney Griner is a striking example. 3/

Even when there is action, like the expulsion of up to 500 SVR operatives embedded in European embassies, it limits capabilities, enforces need to adapt, but the operational risks still remain low. Russian operatives can act with feeling of impunity. 4/ https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/16/uk/mi5-chief-russia-spying-iran-china-threats-intl/index.html…

This even extends to members of the infamous unit 29155, associated with several high profile murders and sabotage across Europe. Most operatives make it safely home one way or the other. Some are even paraded in Russian media after being uncovered and returned, like Butina. 5/

The importance of establishing a low risk environment for Russian operative extends to the highest levels. In the infamous Putin/Carlson interview arguably one of the most important messages by Putin to the West referred to exchanging the "Tiergarten Assassin" E Gershkovich. 6/

One reason Russia holds innocent Westerners hostage is, that Western operatives usually face a much more dire fate and can't be exchanged. This imbalance of operative risk also extends to the services and political level. Russia has no democratic oversight, media, rule of law. 7/

The systemic imbalance also extends to counter intelligence operations. Russia takes advantage of our open, liberal societies and protection by rule of law while Russia can employ the tools of a totalitarian surveillance and police state with extensive security apparatus. 8/

It is widely accepted that the main attack vector of Russian intelligence isn't only classic information gathering, sabotage, destabilization or elimination of dissidents. The main attack vector is against the Western social and political systems. It is "regime change" ops. 9/

Russian services found and support political allies who share their goal to overthrow rule of law and liberal democracy. The more these efforts succeed the harder they are to counter. Even unwitting Citizens are weaponized by Russia, resisting attempts to counter the threat. 10/

Russia arguably also has advantage in the field of intelligence doctrine. "Information" is seen in a much broader sense as in Western understanding. Influence ops, cyber, sabotage and cooperation with organized/economic crime form a holistic approach. 11/ https://twitter.com/DonbasDIY/status/1755294497041186860…

Countering the holistic Russian approach to information war is difficult for Western services. Doctrine, administrative and legal boundaries present a challenge. Some agencies yet have started to explore a more innovative approach, also utilizing resilient citizens NGOs. 12/

Decentralized citizens movements are a mixed blessing. They are, as social phenomenon, themselves susceptible to hostile influence ops and show a tendency to develop characteristics of activism instead of resilience. They are not resilient per se. 13/ https://x.com/VladVexler/status/1749083551272673560?s=20…

Recent research gives rise to the assumption, that decentralized movements may have been identified as potential threat and been targeted by Russia or non state political actors. Focus on resilience & democratic values, not activism, can be a defense. 14/ https://x.com/CatherineBelton/status/1751217259953991938?s=20…

A possible explanation for the careful response to Russian ops might be the vulnerability of, for example, European infrastructure to sabotage. Even critical (especially distributed) infrastructure is hard to protect, drones fly over mil installations etc. Riots are a threat. 15/

We Can Win The Intelligence War. First we need to realize: Information war is war. Full stop. Essential is, to disable safe havens for hostile operatives and services. Attacking the West needs to come with significant cost as deterrent. Key will be domestic Russian allies. 16/

Fighting domestic allies of hostile actors will present a challenge to balance liberal freedoms with the need to adapt our doctrine and legal frameworks. The Russian approach, to amplify suitable organic grievances, support structuring of political movements, is problematic. 17/

Reducing our own vulnerability is essential. First of all this means hardening our critical infrastructure, investing into redundancy and diversification of critical supply chains. We need to address how Russian services mesh with organized/economic crime, control cash flow. 18/

The impact of online information spaces on society and intel ops raises the need to recognise them as critical infrastructure for national security on the same level as physical infrastructure. This extends to communities that need to be supported vs attack by hostile actors. 19/

Western intel (and maybe mil) doctrine has to adapt to counter the holistic Russian approach more effectively. We can learn from eastern European agencies that have adapted to the direct threat Russian ops impose on them. The threat is transnational. 20/ https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1759929696374972539?s=20…

Grassroots resilient citizen movements might become an interesting expansion of capabilities, increasing societal resilience. It will be essential to develop ways of cooperation with official agencies that won't limit the organic, decentralized and agile nature of such NGOs. 21/

In terms of doctrine it might be interesting to adapt the intelligence cycle. The experience of Ukrainian agencies have shown the benefits of fast, agile information & reaction cycles. Politics needs to be informed (interested) when domestic political discourse creates risks. 22/

Before all we should not forget that the most efficient way to reduce the threat of Russian intelligence operations is to reduce Russian capabilities. Arguably this means political will, persistent sanctions regime and critically: To support Ukraine to a decisive victory. 23/

Also: China. A shout out to @ACIPSS ! They are a great source of information with many excellent researchers! 24/