56bn for Ukraine
Zero Trust for Germany?
#Germany is both
#Ukraine’s biggest European supporter in absolute financial terms
- AND rightly seen as problem by allies (As well as by many Germans)
Here’s why.
(& no, it’s not just Scholz, the SPD &
#Taurus)
There's a lot of confusion & conflicting figures flying around, so what support has
provided to
in financial terms?
We use
Govt figures (because they're unlikely to be underestimates) but pls correct if needed.
We also separate military from other aid
(to 24/02/24).
German military aid to Ukraine
- €12.082bn in military aid DELIVERED
(6.6bn buying equipment for Ukraine
5bn in 2023, 1.6bn in 2022
5.2bn value kit donated from stocks, 282m training UA soldiers)
(16bn more promised for future but we don't include that as its not there yet)
***€56bn in Total***
That's huge (no1 in
) so how can many allies still be, legitimately, angry with
#Germany's approach?
There are several reasons (see below) but the biggest is that they see
as pursuing a different goal than theirs
They don't see
as pursuing
victory
This causes big problems that have been seen in the:
-What
-When
-(un)willingness
Of many of Germany's contributions.
The what is clear - from the helmets but no guns last the start to
not now delivering Taurus cruise missiles even tho
&
have sent StormShadow & Scalp
The when has also been key.
As
@Rt. Hon Ben Wallace MP recently said, Germany has dragged its feet over many arms deliveries, only agreeing to send kit when allied pressure has been overwhelming.
This has cost Ukraine dear - eg when the delay over Leopards allowed Russia to dig in.
And the unwillingness to send military kit, only caving under pressure was highlighted by
@Emmanuel Macron -'those saying never never now [to ground troops or Taurus] were saying never never to tanks, to IFVs', etc.
And so allies can think
underestimates the danger to UA & us
But still, those numbers on the monetary value of German support are HUGE - & shouldn't be underplayed.
Though, given
is the largest European state by population & largest economy, you would expect
to be the biggest contributor
& relative to GDP
is only mid-table
Moreover, many allies (esp but not only in CEE) see Germany's policy over the last 20 years as giving the country a disproportionate responsibility to support Ukraine b/c its previous approach empowered Russia.
(This is a point often echoed by Scholz' critics in Germany)
Despite that, Chancellor Scholz has gone out of his way to criticise others for not doing enough - in financial terms - even though they may have lead in other ways (what they delivered, timing of deliveries, higher class of weapons, or higher % of GDP) which gets no
credit
Instead, he keeps pointing to how much
has spent.
Which creates a problem because that's not really the point - it's not a contest but, rather, there is a war to win
- & the true comparison (as allies see it) is to WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO WIN.
where they see
holding back
When they see
holding back & not doing what is needed to win, thus seemingly not appreciating the urgency of
's need & the risk to European security, it raises suspicions & creates anger, which isn't helped by SPD talk about 'freexing' the war [how??]
This is compounded by contradictory messages from the Chancellery which, with only slight caricature are
- to Allies: we are doing so much & sending so many weapons
- to Moscow: we are not really involved in the war & respect your red lines
Which is only made worse still by the further suspicion that across SPD, CDU/CSU &
business there are some who would want to end the war by any means & incl. to get back to business with Russia & so they push a focus on future rels with Moscow not
winning the war.
The problem is that successful teams have a common goal - & that's what we currently lack.
This is why there is such frustration with
despite its ostensibly massive contribution in terms of absolute financial value.
- Olaf Scholz has not yet said Ukraine should win.
And its clear from his approach that his govt is not pursuing the goal of
victory.
Until that changes, this is in effect a very expensive way to damage
's reputation & make Europe less safe.
But its not just the Chancellor & SPD that are to blame
As long as they don't put *effective* pressure on Scholz to change course & back Ukraine to win, the Greens & FDP as coalition partners are enablers of this flawed approach.
they've been strong on the need to stand up to Putin but haven't yet been able to stand up to Scholz.
That effective pressure (ultimately backed up by credible threat to leave the coalition, given this is a matter of vital national interest) would be made a lot easier if the CDU/CSU stopped attacking the Greens (& to be fair, Merz has toned it down, but Söder hasn't)
That would make other coalition options more viable possibilities, & thus increase potential leverage that the Greens in particular would be ale to exert.
Lastly & again given this is a matter of vital national interest &
's ability to work with allies is also key ...
The SPD need to stop playing domestic party politics with national security.
The 'peace' positioning (risking appeasement of Putin) OTOH & the harder line fro Pistorius on the other creates a false field in which Scholz seems to take a 'reasonable' middle ground ... BUT ...
It is a false middle ground & it's not seen as reasonable by allies.
Germany will not get the credit from allies that Berlin thinks its large financial contribution merits until it changes course & adopts the common TEAM goal:
Ukraine's victory
Allies from
to the Nordics,
to the Baltics have been crystal clear that
must WIN-b/c its in our vital interest.
If
commits to & measures its contribution to that goal, stepping up where needed, its contribution will be properly valued & it can better ask more of others. END