Coup Proofing in Russia?
Replacing Shoigu with Belousov was widely interpreted as move to strengthen the mil/ind complex performance. That analysis ignored the main motivator informing Kremlin conduct: System survival.
What we see now is a decapitation of the MoD and Army.
1/
Head of the Main Communications Directorate, Deputy Chief of Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Shamarin Vadim Anatolyevich, has been reportedly detained.
Under new Management?
Think of Russia as a mafia run company to facilitate embezzlement and money laundering. Turning around such structures is a herculean task even without the stress of a war, and an extraction focused economy under sanctions.
Belousov also is a Gosplan guy.
2/
The type of management Belousov can implement in reasonable time is centralization and squeezing companies. But Rostec is already centralized and preemptively puts up resistance. It's run by Chemezov as a cash cow for the mafia Don himself.
So why make Belousov Minister now?
3/
War (never) changes!
Belousov's main feat is that he has no patronage system in the armed forces. He is a non Silovik heading the main source of kinetic power in Russia.
War disturbed the fine balanced pillars of the vertical of power in Russia. War makes military powerful.
4/
Over the last years several indicators for growing dissatisfaction in the AFRF became visible - across all ranks, from the Mobik on TG to the commander of an army, Popov. The internal distribution of funds to the military also contributed to stress for the established system.
5/
Who has the guns?
Arguably the expansive use of PMC was an attempt to balance control over military capabilities and distribute it to Putin loyalists. In a sense this was an attempt to recycle the tried and trusted Kremlin balancing system.
That's power worth fighting over it.
6/
Watching Russia at times gave the impression that important actors were more focused on fighting over the control over military capabilities than fighting the Ukrainian army.
After Prigozhin's escapade the situation became untenable for the Kremlin, the Putinist system failed.
7/
A stupid (mafia) Intelligence State!
A government reshuffle lays the foundation for change. An extensive reshuffle tells us what's top priority for the regime.
What we witness is yet not a rapid change in economy, sacking of CEO's. We see rapid changes in military leadership.
8/
Shoigu's extensive patronage system is being disassembled. Professional soldiers with esprit de corps (often opposed to Shoigu) are being arrested. All conducted by an aggressive FSB in a seemingly larger coordinated operation.
It seems that Cheka is taking back control.
9/
Arguably the FSB/intel networks w/ institutionalized corruption are the foundation of Kremlin power structures. It appears the Kremlin felt that as the war against Ukraine dragged on the military has become unreliable.
What we see now is the intel state clawing back control.
10/
The growing extent of the purges yet does not speak for a clever, subtly managed intelligence state. The Cheka makes extensive noise, rumbles through established systems of patronage and loyalty like a rabid bear.
The sense of urgency and perceived threat is noticeable.
11/
Deprofessionalizing an Army!
Competent, professional and ambitious officers can easily become a threat to a corrupt system of government. Especially when they feel their advice is not heeded and the army wasted senselessly.
It's a trade off between risk and army efficiency.
12/
The war has already degraded the professional core of the lower army ranks to dangerous levels. Now it seems the Kremlin is attriting the upper echelons of professional officers for regime stability reasons.
With a deprofessionalized army the conduct of war might change too.
13/
Is the Future Hybrid Max?
Degrading the army leadership creates a bleak outlook for the capability to conduct successful large scale operations. Together with other indicators, like increasing sabotage activity, this could mean that Russia is seeking success by hybrid means.
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This would mesh with the stronger role of domestic intel structures. Russian military ops in Ukraine would then be less focused on controlling terrain and military victories but to shape the political environment in Ukraine and the west via the terror of military pressure.
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It's important to not mistake this terror for military strength or interpret some 4D chess plan in what's essentially terrorist activity.
Instead we should prepare that the Russian intelligence mafia state will ramp up it's terror and sabotage in our western societies.
16/END