How does #Russia look at the #Israel-#Iran war? How is Russia reacting; how will it position itself; what are its cards; what are its concerns - and what are the implications for its war against #Ukraine? Aon 6 themes

1) Russia gets active in int. fora, expresses platitudes about Israel's violation of int. law, urges deescalation: -in line with longstanding Russian practice -see yesterday at UNSC -Russia called IAEA BoG extraordinary session (Mond) This is the least Iran expects of Russia! /2

2) Russia offers mediation/facilitation: -calls for a return to negotiation on the nuclear file emanate from Kremlin & MFA statements -Putin also stressed this in calls with Netanyahu & Pezeshkian yesterday -the Kremlin had expressed its readiness to help Trump's diplomacy... /3

-...with Iran for weeks This was always going to be a fine balancing act for Russia: How to appear helpful to the US while not freaking out Iran (where some constituencies harbour a longstanding fear that Russia will throw them under the bus for sake of great-power diplomacy) /4

But Putin has tried to engage the US on global dossiers *without making it about Ukraine* - calculating that much was to be gained, as I argued in @Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/c207d0db-d2a2-48de-9aa2-42121b0da918… Hence the repeated (& continued) statements of willingness to play a role vis-a-vis Iran /5

(Side note: Russia hates to be sidelined in Mideast diplomacy. It does not like it when the US engages unilaterally, it wants a seat at the table. This was true during Trump 1 and the Abraham Accords, and it remains true today.) /6

The real question is: As this conflict plays out, does Russia have the carrots/sticks to get Iran back to the negotiating table? Is Russia a decisive factor here re: Iranian calculations what to do next? I have my doubts. /7

3) Russian apprehensions about the end game: -All that said, Russia is worried about how this Israel-Iran war might play out -Warnings of WW3 (Medvedev, Dmitriev, Dugin) are hyperbole - but fears are nonetheless real -Russia is concerned about war with Iran causing... /8

1) regional spill-over (esp. destabilise the South Caucasus), 2) unrest inside Iran that could lead to regime change; -These fears, apparent from Russian reactions over past 24 hours, go back at least 20 yrs! (Add: Russia has little bandwidth for the South Caucasus right now) /9

4) Awe for Israel: -Simonyan's tweet yesterday that "the stronger wins" is indicative of a broader sentiment, I think -Fundamentally, Putin likes winners, not losers -The Oct 7 debacle dented Israel's reputation with the Russian security services /10

-But since then, Israel has restored its (coercive) reputation with Russia through its campaign last year (the pager attack; the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran, etc.) -This was a sentiment Israeli interlocutors shared during my visit earlier this year /11

5) Consequences for the Ukraine battlefield: -There are initial reports that Iran has halted all arms deliveries to Russia -That seems conceivable, even highly plausible -I think the impact for Russia in Ukraine will be modest at best: /12

-Variants of the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) remain the cornerstone of Russia’s deep-strike one-way attack UAV campaign in Ukraine - but they are largely domestically produced now -As Russia localized the production, it spun off more & more variations from the initial Iranian designs/13

-A growing focus on other UAV designs also portends a shift away from reliance on Iran -Reliance on Iran for UAV components subsided This doesn't mean there's no more Russian interest in Iranian UAV production tech or assistance - but Russia is less dependent than in 2022-23 /14

Might Russia have hoped for more Iranian missiles, and those hopes are now dashed? -It's of course possible - but the delivered Fateh 360 were not used on the battlefield, I believe -Ukraine estimates that, as of mid-May, Russia had stockpiled 13,000 missiles... /15

...of various ranges and can produce up to 200 missiles per month https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2025… That suggests Russia is probably OK without Iranian missiles. /16

All in all, Russia-Iran defense cooperation has become more asymmetrical in 2024 - with Iran again more reliant on Russia than vice versa - and the ongoing war will only great amplify this trend. Which brings me to the final point: /17

6) What can/will Russia do for Iran? -military engagement on behalf of Iran seems out of the question -besides support in int. fora & diplomacy, the question is to what extent Russia can/is willing to help Iran reconstitute its conventional capabilities after this blow /18

-Russia did not deliver Su-35 or advanced air defenses before - why would it do so now? -The interesting thing is that some Russian observers had warned, after Israel's April and Oct 2024 strikes, that Russian conventional support... /19

-...was needed to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. I do not believe Russia wants Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Neither does it want a totally weak (and hence potentially unstable) Iran - so what (more) will Russia be willing/able to do? Let's wait and see. /20

For now, Russia will play its cards cautiously & observe how the situation plays out - understanding that it has ltd. leverage over the course of events And try to be involved in whatever comes next, while avoiding entanglement/overextension Ukraine remains the priority /END