Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 1/17

Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17

The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17

No one even knows where the HEU is now! @Rafael Mariano Grossi says Iran moved it. Lil' @Marco Rubio says nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @Planet took a picture. 4/17

Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn't a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17

To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. @JD Vance says they're going to "have conversations with the Iranians about" it. The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran's ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine. 6/17

IT'S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17

In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to "the heart of the mountain" there. This facility is huge -- we estimated 10,000 m2 or more -- and we don't really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17 https://x.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1933154069151138281…

Also, Iran recently announced a "new enrichment facility in a secure location" and told the @Iaea it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The @Iaea was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn't been bombed AFAIK. 9/17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKwvH_NvDg4…

Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The @IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ was about to go see it. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran -- but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17

This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17

Let's say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that's about five months although IMMV. 12/17

Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17 https://www.amazon.com/Vulcan-607-Remarkable-British-Attack/dp/0552152293…

But what does it say of two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran's nuclear program? I think that's proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17

RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA "sunsetting" are now happy to delay Iran's bomb by much less. 15/17

This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, @DIA said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, @Marco Rubio said intel was "irrelevant." It's only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17

We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17