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David Daoud

David Daoud
@DavidADaoud

Oct 29
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I see Matt is still biting off more than he can chew. I'll lay out the positions of the Joint List that make it an unacceptable coalition partner to Zionist parties -- and since Matt knows neither Hebrew nor Arabic, I'll translate where relevant to English. 🧵

The Joint List supports the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in accordance with international law, which is what Israel’s DC advocates long demanded. It’s quite telling that Satloff now calls this is “an alternative to the fundamental idea of the state.”
The Joint List is explicitly anti-Zionist, and its 2026 election platform advocates constitutional changes that conflict with Israel's existing definition as the nation-state of the Jewish people. It also adopts positions on security, military service, Palestinian refugees, and Israel's foreign policy that conflict with those of most Zionist parties. These aren't mere statements by individual MKs, but are in the Joint List's official electoral platform -- jointly issued by the Joint List's constituent parties, Hadash, Ta'al and Balad. jointlist.org.il/he/platform/
1. Explicit rejection of Zionism The platform describes the Joint List as: "a genuine democratic alternative to the racist Zionist consensus." Not merely opposition to Netanyahu or particular Israeli governments or their policies, but to Zionism itself.
2. Changing Israel's constitutional and national character Under Section 3 of the Platform, From Racism to Full Equality, the Joint List advocates: A constitutional framework founded on equal citizenship regardless of national or religious affiliation. Recognition of Palestinian Arabs in Israel as an indigenous national community with collective national rights [in Israel]. Separation of religion and state. Repeal of legislation it considers to establish Jewish supremacy, particularly the Nation-State Basic Law. Now this might sound noble, except for the fact that the Joint List defines Zionism itself as racist (see Point 1). The 2018 Nation-State Basic Law establishes that national self-determination in Israel is exclusive to the Jewish people. Repealing that law and replacing its constitutional principles would materially change Israel's existing constitutional definition. There is an important qualification: advocating equal citizenship or repealing the Nation-State Law does not, by itself, necessarily entail abolishing every aspect of Israel's Jewish character. However, Balad, a constituent party of the Joint List and an explicitly Arab/Palestinian nationalist party, explicitly advocates transforming Israel into a “state of all its citizens” rather than one constitutionally defined as Jewish. en.idi.org.il/israeli-electi
3. Palestinian right of return This goes directly to @Matt Duss's claim that the Joint List endorses the same two-state solution as the D.C. pro-Israel consensus. The Joint List's platform explicitly endorses: "their right of return in accordance with international resolutions, foremost among them Resolution 194." It combines this demand with support for a Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel. So the Joint List's platform distinguishes the Palestinian refugee question/its solution/right of return from Palestinian statehood. A broad implementation of refugee return into Israel could fundamentally alter its demographic balance and Jewish-majority character. However, the platform does not specify the number of refugees it seeks to admit into Israel or how that return would operate.
4. Opposition to strengthening the IDF and increasing military spending The Joint List's separate 2026 economic platform calls for: "A deep cut in military spending" It also advocates ending government funding for the Gaza war, settlements, and Israeli military activity in Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese territories. This is a direct conflict with the Zionist parties' emphasis -- reflecting the Israeli Jewish mainstream consensus -- on strengthening the IDF and rebuilding Israel's military capabilities after October 7. So it is demonstrable that the Joint List, in its platform, seeks to reduce military expenditure and restrict Israeli military activity at a time where 1) the Jewish consensus sees matters in starkly opposing terms and 2) whether Matt will admit it or not, Israel is facing unprecedented security challenges. That is demonstrable. That what the Joint List is explicitly advocating would not leave Israel absolutely defenseless is immaterial -- because it would leave Israel ill-equipped to deal with its current security challenges, and Matt doesn't get to be the arbiter of whether those challenges exist or are valid. There's also a practical dimension to this disagreement that would make any Eisenkott Gov't depending on the Joint List very short lived -- as a matter of law: this means the Joint List will not vote with the rest of Eisenkott's coalition on defense spending, a central issue, when a budget comes to vote. That means there will be no budget, and I can assure Matt and all the other pseudo-enlightened DC bots banging on about including the Joint List as if it's the solution: the votes for the budget to offset the Joint List abstaining or explicitly opposing will not come from the Netanyahu-led opposition -- not from Likud, not from Otzma, and not from Religious Zionism/Zehut. Why? Because under Section 36A of Basic Law: The Knesset, failure to pass the state budget by the statutory deadline automatically dissolves the Knesset and triggers early elections. No dissolution vote is required. Assuming a government is formed now, if the 26th Knesset cannot pass a 2027 budget and no qualifying extension applies, it automatically dissolves on April 1, 2027, triggering elections around the end of June. Bibi has every incentive to deny the budget votes from outside the coalition. Here's the actual text of the law: 36A.(a) If the state budget bill has not been passed within three months of the beginning of the fiscal year, the day following the conclusion of the above period (to be known as the determining day) shall be considered as if the Knesset had decided to dissolve itself before the end of its term, and early elections shall be held on the last Tuesday before the end of 90 days from the determining day, unless the Knesset has decided by a majority of its members, within five days of the determining day, due to the proximity of the election date to a festival, holiday, or memorial day, to hold elections at a later date, but no later than 100 days from the determining day. gov.il/apps/elections
5. Opposition to conscription—including Haredi conscription Section 15 of the Joint List's electoral platform explicitly rejects compulsory military and civilian service. jointlist.org.il/he/platform/ More significantly, the Joint List explicitly confirmed its opposition to drafting Haredim in September 2026. Responding to Ynet's questionnaire, the party stated: אין להטיל סנקציות על אדם שבוחר שלא להתגייס “Sanctions should not be imposed on someone who chooses not to enlist.” ynet.co.il/news/elections Now, I know Matt probably gets most of his information on Israeli politics from TikTok, but this is a central plank of the opposition's electoral pitch -- from Eisenkot, to Liberman, to Bennett, to Golan. The idea of "equality of burden" is something that Israel cannot afford to push off any longer, it is having a damaging impact on the IDF's battle-readiness, manpower, reserve duty, etc. with the latter two factors having reverberations on the economy/cost of living/ taxes. This creates a direct conflict with Eisenkot's proposed universal-service framework. The Joint List opposes the premise that expanding the IDF's manpower is necessary or desirable, whereas Eisenkot makes it a central objective. This means that the opposition, whose main pitch to the Israeli electorate was universal conscription, will be unable to fulfill a central promise -- and that's not just about eroding the public's trust (which will redound to Netanyahu's benefit in the future), it will leave the current government very vulnerable to efforts by Netanyahu, from the oppositon, to bring down the government prematurely (see: the Bennett-Lapid Government from 2021-2022 and how those internal disagreements created openings for Netanyahu to to slowly create fissures and whittle away the government into collapse). Btw, Mansour Abbas' Ra'am is likewise opposed to universal conscription/service and has remained agnostic on Haredi conscription. But they alone would not get an Eisenkott government over the 61 line (8 seats per most updated results)
6. Opposition to Israel's military operations and security policies The Joint List's platform, Section 1, calls for ending Israel's military control of Gaza, lifting the blockade, ending settlement activity, and establishing a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines. It also describes Israel's Gaza campaign as a war of genocide. The Joint List's positions conflict with the security priorities of parties that support continued Israeli military freedom of action against Hamas and other armed organizations like Hezbollah.
7. The Joint List leader's refusal to call Hamas a terrorist organization This is a particularly relevant contemporary example. October 13, 2026: At a Ynet conference, Joint List chairman Yousef Jabareen was asked why Arab politicians struggled to call Hamas a terrorist organization. He responded: אני לא משתמש במונחים ובביטויים שהימין או התקשורת כופים עלינו "I don't use terms and expressions that the right or the media impose on us.” He nevertheless reiterated Hadash's condemnation of October 7. But refusing to identify Hamas as a terrorist organization is distinct from supporting Hamas. But it creates a demonstrable political disagreement with Zionist parties that explicitly make Hamas's elimination as a military organization a central security objective (even if they, like Bennett, have articulated support for ending the war and using different means of pressure, including economic and diplomatic in addition to short military operations, to bring about Hamas' demise). ynet.co.il/news/elections Btw, Mansour Abbas has likewise repeatedly refused to describe Hamas as a terrorist organization -- as recent as October 27, 2026 i24news.tv/en/news/israel youtube.com/watch?v=Vxs4bz kan.org.il/content/kan-ne And he has declined to say he supports Hamas' destruction. On November 10, 2025 -- kan.org.il/content/kan-ne On November 24, 2025 -- explaining cryptically, "maybe I don't want to be assassinated." mako.co.il/news-politics/ February 14, 2026 -- mako.co.il/news-politics/ July 28, 2026, asked repeatedly by Esti Perez-Ben Ami, Abbas became very angry and at most said "יש לי תשובה חד-משמעית, אבל לא אגיד" “I have an unequivocal answer, but I won't say it.” -- youtube.com/watch?v=Vxs4bz September 25, 2026 -- alongside Yoav Segalovitz. Interviewer Dana Weiss noted Segalovits regarded Hamas as a terror org, that must be destroyed, Abbas refused to endorse the formulation, this time arguing that it could be interpreted as calling for the destruction of Gaza's population. mako.co.il/news-israel-el
8. Support for international proceedings accusing Israel of genocide January 7–8, 2024: Hadash MK Ofer Cassif publicly endorsed South Africa's application to the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza. Cassif argued that his constitutional obligations were to Israeli society, rather than the government, and that supporting the proceedings was consistent with those obligations. The Joint List's 2026 platform subsequently adopted the characterization of Israel's Gaza campaign as genocide. timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry
9. Refusal to finance military and settlement policies as the price of parliamentary cooperation This is especially important for the current coalition negotiations. October 10, 2026: Jabareen announced that the Joint List would consider providing parliamentary support to a government replacing Netanyahu, but not without conditions. He explained that such support could not come at the price of voting for military or settlement budgets, accepting the Nation-State Law, or remaining silent about Israel's actions in Gaza. His exact statement was: אנחנו לא נותנים צ'ק פתוח. "We are not giving a blank check." ynet.co.il/news/elections mako.co.il/news-israel-el So, even if the Joint List were prepared to support Eisenkot's government from outside the coalition, its demands would create obstacles to passing budgets, funding military operations, or advancing legislation it considers inconsistent with Palestinian national rights -- which brings us back to Basic Law: the Knesset, Section 36A.
Now, several things can be true at once: 1 - PM Netanyahu's warnings against "Arabs voting in droves" is fundamentally at odds with the principles of democracy, including Israeli democracy -- as enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and as expressed in Basic Law: the Knesset's provision guaranteeing "equal elections." 2 - The positions of the Arab Parties on fundamental matters of the country's identity and future are simply non-starters for the Jewish Israeli mainstream's majority -- and on fundamental issues, indeed existential issues like Haredi integration, are at odds with what Israel needs to do in the next four years and the platforms that the opposition's Zionist parties ran on. 3 - Mansour Abbas' Ra'am party is more pragmatic, and is promoting gradual integration of Arab society into the mainstream of Israel as a Jewish State -- but necessarily has to do so in small increments. But that leaves it a) unable to fulfill Israel's needs of the moment and b) it simply lacks the seats to get the Eisenkot-led coalition over the 61-seat finish line. 4 - Most, or at least sizable swathes, of Arab Israeli citizens want integration into the State of Israel as it is (I think Ra'am's showing as the single largest Arab party demonstrates that) and share the concerns, sentiments, and positions of the rest of their countrymen, even if there isn't total alignment with the Jewish mainstream on every issue. 5 - The Zionist parties, from the Left and the Right, have failed (likely by not even attempting) to try to make significant inroads into the Arab Israeli population to make them durable constituencies aligned with the Israeli Jewish mainstream, or have undertaken actions/alliances that have put off Arab Israelis from voting for them (Likud's alliance with Ben Gvir and Smotrich, for example). Not to say this effort would necessarily have succeeded, but it should be attempted: the Zionist Left and the Right should be vying for Arab votes, rather than leaving them to sectoral parties whose platforms are inimical to the State's interests (same with Haredim). Bottom line, it's far more complicated than the attempts by @Phil Gordon, @Matt Duss, and @Peter Beinart to reduce it all to a matter of race and racism. Those calls address nothing and solve nothing.
Let's also look at the explicit positions of each of the Change Bloc's constituent Zionist parties, and their conditions for sitting with other parties in a coalition.
1. Yashar! (ישר!) — Gadi Eisenkot Conditions for coalition participation Eisenkot has articulated four threshold requirements: - Jewish and democratic state: Recognition of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, liberal state maintaining a substantial Jewish majority. -Declaration of Independence: Acceptance of its principles and values. -Universal service: Acceptance of compulsory military, national, or civilian service, including for Haredim and Arab citizens. -Hamas: Recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be dismantled or destroyed. These are requirements for coalition partners, not merely policy preferences. Eisenkot also rules out another Netanyahu-led government. ynet.co.il/news/elections yasharwitheisenkot.com/agenda_point mako.co.il/news-politics/ Eisenkott has also explicitly distinguished Arab identity as a non-starter from the positions of Arab parties as non-starters. In his October 10 @ynet interview, Eisenkot explained: קבעתי ארבעה כללי יסוד כדי לעקוף את השאלה עם מי אשב ועם מי לא “I established four fundamental rules to bypass the question of whom I will or won't sit with.” After enumerating the rules, he said: אני לא מכיר אף מפלגה ערבית שמקבלת את זה “I don't know any Arab party that accepts these.” He also criticized PM Netanyahu for treating Arab citizens and Arab political representatives as collectively illegitimate. Matan Kahana, another Yashar candidate, said on October 26 that the party would not join a coalition with parties unwilling to define Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be destroyed, adding that no Arab party had made that declaration. srugim.co.il/?s=%D7%9B%D7%9 Conditional Support for Minority Government In his October 10 interview, Eisenkot said that, if his bloc failed to secure 61 seats, he would still put his proposed government to a Knesset confidence vote. He would not ask Arab or Haredi parties to support it, abstain, or absent themselves. On October 14, he explicitly said he would seek to invest a government with 58 or 59 MKs, then attempt to expand it through the participation of additional Zionist MKs. mako.co.il/news-politics/ His position is therefore not a categorical refusal of minority government. It is a proposal to invest a minority cabinet without negotiating an outside-support agreement with Arab or Haredi parties -- because that would prevent Yashar from fulfilling its electoral promises/positions.
2. B'Yachad (ביחד) — Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid Conditions for coalition participation - Only Zionist parties: At their April 26–27 announcement of the joint list, Bennett said: “נסתמך רק על המפלגות הציוניות” — “We will rely only on Zionist parties.” -No Netanyahu: Bennett has ruled out governing with Netanyahu, including a rotation arrangement. Lapid has similarly rejected another Netanyahu-led unity government. - No Otzma Yehudit: Bennett explicitly rejected coalition participation with Itamar Ben-Gvir's party. -Universal service: A service law without blanket Haredi exemptions and an end to public financing that encourages draft evasion. -Restrictions on cabinet membership: On October 6, Bennett said his party would require legislation preventing draft evaders or people who encourage draft evasion from sitting in the security cabinet. -Institutional commitments: A state commission of inquiry into October 7, a constitutional framework based on the Declaration of Independence, and an eight-year prime-ministerial term limit. mako.co.il/news-israel-el be-yahad.org.il/plans/ @Naftali Bennett נפתלי בנט has also noted that his refusal to sit with Arab Parties is about ideology and not identity - April 29, 2026 — Channel 13, Udi Segal Asked why Mansour Abbas could not serve as a minister addressing crime in Arab society, Bennett answered: אני לא שואל מה הצבע, אני קובע את העקרונות והמפלגות הערביות מתנגדות לדבר הזה. “I don't ask what someone's color is. I establish the principles, and the Arab parties oppose those principles.” He specified Zionism, universal service, and a state commission of inquiry into October 7 as his requirements. 13tv.co.il/item/news/poli -June 11, 2026 -- interview with @David Horovitz and @‏Tal Schneider טל שניידר تال شنايدر of @The Times of Israel: Asked why he excluded Mansour Abbas despite Abbas's professed acceptance of Israel's Jewish and democratic character, Bennett answered: “I don’t decide to bring or not bring people [into my coalition] based on their color or race.” He then enumerated four coalition requirements: Zionism, universal military service, a constitution based on the Declaration of Independence, and an October 7 state commission of inquiry. Pressed again on whether he would accept Abbas if he met those conditions, Bennett reiterated that the criteria were principles, not race or personal identity. He described a Zionist Arab willing to serve in the military as a different case. timesofisrael.com/bennett-to-toi -August 9, 2026 with Channel 12's Keren Marciano: Asked about serving with Ra'am, Bennett said: אני לא הולך לפי הגזע, אלא לפי העמדה. נכון להיום, רע"ם היא לא מפלגה ציונית. “I don't go by race, but by political position. As things stand, Ra'am isn't a Zionist party.” mako.co.il/news-politics/ -September 4, 2026 -- @The Jerusalem Post interview with @Herb Keinon and Keshet Neev Asked whether he would again govern with Mansour Abbas, Bennett said no, arguing that the next government must consist of Zionist parties. He then explicitly distinguished political ideology from ethnicity: “This is not based on race. But we are a Zionist country.” Bennett specifically cited Yoseph Haddad, an Arab Zionist candidate, as an example demonstrating that his criterion was Zionism rather than Arab identity. jpost.com/israel-electio -On October 18, 2026, during an interview with Moriah Asraf at the Gaza-border communities conference in Sderot (ועידת העוטף). When asked why he refused to rely on Mansour Abbas despite describing him as a good partner in his previous government, Bennett answered: מפני… לא בגלל שהוא ערבי. בגלל שאני רק אקים ממשלה על בסיס מפלגות ציוניות. “Because … not because he's Arab. Because I will only establish a government based on Zionist parties.” He also described Abbas as: הוא היה אחלה שותף. “He was a great partner.” israelhayom.co.il/news/politics/ -October 20, 2026 — Kikar HaShabbat, interview with Yishai Cohen This interview helps explain the limits of Bennett's position. He again identified acceptance of a Jewish and democratic state and military service as his criteria and asserted that Ra'am did not satisfy them. When confronted with Abbas's support for civilian national service and recognition of Israel's Jewish character, Bennett reiterated that October 7 had changed his coalition calculations. kikar.co.il/interviews/tn5 -October 21, 2026 -- @מעריב | Maariv podcast interview Bennett again explained his position regarding Ra'am in ideological rather than ethnic terms: אני לא מדבר אף פעם פרסונלי, ובטח לא מדבר על גזע או משהו. אני מדבר על התפיסות. “I never speak in personal terms, and certainly not about race or anything like that. I'm talking about political outlooks.” maariv.co.il/news/politics/ He reiterated that the next government should be based on Zionist parties committed to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. He also described Shas and United Torah Judaism as anti-Zionist, illustrating that the criterion was not limited to Arab parties. -October 21, 2026 — Zman Kibbutz, interview with Yair Tauber Asked directly whether Arab parties could legitimately participate in government, Bennett explained that his coalition requirements were Zionism, universal service, a state commission of inquiry into October 7, and a two-term limit for prime ministers. He concluded: זו לא סוגייה של דת, גזע או מין, זו סוגייה הנוגעת לקואליציה יציבה שתהיה מסוגלת להחזיק ממשלה שתבצע מהלכי ענק. "This is not a question of religion, race, or sex. It is a question of a stable coalition capable of sustaining a government that will undertake major reforms.” zman-kibbutz.co.il/25798 Bennett was also explicit in rejecting race/ethnicity/religion as a coalition criterion in one or more of these interviews as well: -June 4, 2026 with Channel 13's Omri Assenheim: youtube.com/watch?v=sZYYu3 -August 22, 2026 inteview with Channel 12's Dana Weiss: youtube.com/watch?v=_HAMja -August 26, 2026 -- interview with Shai Haozmann for Haaydeh, Episode 83 youtube.com/watch?v=VXHCkG Bennett opposes a government dependent on Arab-party support or abstention, including an arrangement that excludes those parties from the cabinet. He reiterated this at Ynet's October 12 election conference, calling suggestions that the change bloc would depend on Arab parties “חרטא” (“nonsense”). ynet.co.il/news/elections So it's not a categorical rejection of every conceivable minority government regardless of how it secured a confidence vote -- just whether or not that would prevent the government from pursuing either B'Yachad's objectives or the coalition's shared objectives. Lapid has sounded more flexible than Bennett on a minority government. Following the October 27 election, Lapid said a government might initially lack a broad coalition and could expand afterward, but was not as explicit on his conditions for a minority government: אולי לא תהיה קואליציה רחבה ביום הראשון - נרחיב אותה בהמשך. “Perhaps there won't be a broad coalition on the first day—we'll expand it later.” mako.co.il/special-mako-n
3. Yisrael Beiteinu (ישראל ביתנו) — Avigdor Lieberman Conditions for coalition participation Lieberman has set both explicit exclusions and specific legislative prerequisites. -No Netanyahu: He will not join any government with Netanyahu, although he expressly allows the possibility of governing with Likud under different leadership. -No Shas or United Torah Judaism: He excludes both Haredi parties from his coalition. -No Ra'am or Joint List: He excludes both Arab parties, including arrangements involving indirect parliamentary support. -Zionist parties only: He insists on a coalition composed exclusively of Zionist parties. -First government decision: Establish a state commission of inquiry into October 7. -First law: Enact universal military or civilian service. Additional requirements: His ten-point governing program includes constitutional reform, secularization measures, core-curriculum requirements, term limits, and economic changes. beytenu.org.il/party-platform October 29, 2026 — Lieberman's post-election statement explicitly reiterated his conditions after voting concluded: ההחלטה הראשונה של הממשלה הבאה חייבת להיות הקמת ועדת חקירה ממלכתית, והחוק הראשון חייב להיות חוק גיוס לכולם. “The next government's first decision must be to establish a state commission of inquiry, and its first law must be universal conscription.” He added that a coalition in which those two commitments were not central from the outset was irrelevant to Yisrael Beiteinu. mako.co.il/special-mako-n Lieberman explicitly distinguishes Arab identity from Arab-party positions At his May 6, 2026 press conference, discussing Ra'am and Mansour Abbas, Lieberman stated: לא נשב עם רע"ם לא בגלל שהם ערבים, אלא בגלל שהם בדלנים. “We won't sit with Ra'am not because they are Arabs, but because they are separatists.” He explained that Abbas wanted Ra'am to become the Arab equivalent of Shas, which Lieberman regarded as another form of sectoral politics and social separation. ynet.co.il/news/article/r This echoed his September 2020 position on the Joint List: אני פוסל את הרשימה המשותפת כי הם רשימה של תומכי טרור, לא בגלל שהם ערבים. “I reject the Joint List because they are a list of terrorism supporters, not because they are Arabs.” When asked whether he would accept a different Arab party that did not support terrorism, Lieberman replied: אין לי שום בעיה. באמת. “I have absolutely no problem. Really.” ynet.co.il/news/article/S And Lieberman did, indeed, join a gov't with Ra'am -- but matters and Israel's needs are different today from June 2021. Liebmeran has explicitly ruled out every permutation of a minority government, including a temporary one. In fact, of all of Eisenkot's potential Change Bloc coalition partners, Lieberman has been the most explicit to categorically reject a minority government strategy. On October 15, he declared: לא נתמוך בשום ממשלת מיעוט, גם לא בממשלת מיעוט לתקופת מעבר. “We will not support any minority government, not even a transitional minority government.” He suggested that MKs from Likud could join a Zionist-majority government without Netanyahu instead. mako.co.il/news-israel-el He reaffirmed the exclusion on October 29, saying: לא נשב לא עם ביבי ולא עם טיבי. “We will sit neither with Bibi nor with Tibi.” He also reiterated his refusal to govern with the Haredi leaders or depend on the Arab parties directly or indirectly. ynet.co.il/news/elections
4. The Democrats (הדמוקרטים) — Yair Golan Conditions for coalition participation Golan has articulated explicit exclusions, alongside substantive requirements for potential coalition partners. -No Netanyahu: Golan has categorically ruled out joining another Netanyahu-led government. -No Smotrich or Ben-Gvir: He explicitly excludes the parties led by both politicians. -No politicians evading military service: On October 12, Golan declared that the Democrats would not sit with those evading military service, including the Haredi politicians he identified in his interview. -Acceptance of Israel as the Jewish people's national home and a free, democratic state: Golan has presented this as the criterion for considering political partnership, including with Arab parties. -Protection of democratic institutions: Judicial independence, constitutional protections, safeguarding democratic institutions, and reversing measures the party considers damaging to democracy are central governing commitments. -Universal service and an October 7 state commission of inquiry: Both feature in the party's governing agenda. WShile not every item in the broader Democrats' political program has been declared a non-negotiable coalition-entry condition, Golan made his exclusions explicit on October 12, 2026: לא נשב עם ביבי, לא נשב עם הלאומנים הקיצונים סמוטריץ' ובן גביר, ולא נשב עם משתמטים מהשירות הצבאי. “We will not sit with Bibi, we will not sit with the extremist nationalists Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, and we will not sit with those evading military service.” ynet.co.il/news/elections Golan explicitly affirms and supports sitting with current Arab Parties in the government -September 23 — Golan's statement opposing the disqualification of Arab parties אנחנו הדמוקרטים נגן בנחישות על זכותם של אזרחי ישראל הערבים לבחור, להיבחר ולהיות שותפים בהנהגת המדינה. “We Democrats will resolutely defend Arab Israeli citizens' right to vote, be elected, and participate in governing the country.” He opposed blanket disqualification of Ra'am and the Joint List while supporting the individual disqualification of Balad's Sami Abu Shahadeh over specific statements. Golan applied the same proposed exclusion to Ben-Gvir. ynet.co.il/news/elections -October 3, 2026 -- Golan explicitly endorsed including Ra'am in the government: כן, עם רע"ם. שותפות יהודית-ערבית בממשלה היא דבר חיובי. “Yes, with Ra'am. Jewish-Arab partnership in government is a positive thing.” He called Mansour Abbas a good coalition partner in the 2021–2022 government and said he would attempt to persuade Bennett, Lieberman, and Eisenkot to reconsider their objections. mako.co.il/news-politics/ October 12, 2026 — Ynet interview בעיניי, כל מי שיקבל את העקרון שישראל היא ביתו של העם היהודי ומדינה חופשית ודמוקרטית - הוא פוטנציאל לשותפות. “In my view, anyone who accepts the principle that Israel is the home of the Jewish people and a free and democratic state is a potential partner.” He also said: ההנחה הזאת שאחרי 7/10 אי אפשר לשבת עם הערבים היא לחלוטין לא מקובלת עליי. “The assumption that after October 7 one cannot govern with Arabs is entirely unacceptable to me.” ynet.co.il/news/elections Golan explicitly supports establishing a government with outside parliamentary support, including from Arab parties October 27 — Election-night statement אם יש רוב דמוקרטי להחלפת ממשלת החורבן ולהצלת ישראל: חייבים לממש אותו. בין אם בקואליציה מלאה או בתמיכה מבחוץ. “If there is a democratic majority to replace the government and save Israel, it must be realized—whether through a full coalition or outside support.” ynet.co.il/news/elections At that same event, Democrats MK Naama Lazimi said: מהרגע הראשון אמרנו - צריך לשבת עם רע"ם. “From the beginning, we said we should govern with Ra'am.” She urged the other opposition leaders to establish a coalition with Mansour Abbas's party.
All of the foregoing is why I agree with the sentiment of @Arash Azizi آرش عزیزی's posts here (x.com/arash_tehran/s) and a little less here (x.com/arash_tehran/s) But I cannot see how it will work practically. Sure, the government will be replaced, but on the practical matters, this would leave an Eisenkott-led government unable to fulfill central electoral promises of either his or the coalition's other parties. And sure, democracy is a series of trade-offs, but the trade-off here would very likely affect issues that are frankly ticking time bombs that, if not addressed properly and thoroughly now, could become irreversible existential threats to Israel.
Haredi parties are already signaling to Eisenkot that they could end up supporting him. Eisenkot really does have a chance to form a government if he is serious about it
David Daoud

David Daoud

@DavidADaoud
🇺🇸 Senior Fellow @FDD. J.D. in Int'l Law/Laws of Armed Conflict. Focused on the nexus of Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon. יהודי מהעדה הלבנונית.
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